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Case No. 20150594-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of possession with
-~

intent to distribute a controlled substance, second degree felonies, Utah Code
Ann. §58-37-S(l)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2015); two counts of possession of a
controlled substance, class B misdemeanors, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(i)
(West Supp. 2015); and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, Utah
Code Ann. §58-37a-5(1) (West 2012), a class B misdemeanor. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Police found distributable amounts of methamphetamine and

Oxycodone, along with a digital scale and other drug paraphernalia, in a safe
stowed in the h·unk of a car Defendant's wife was driving.

The safe also
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contained checks and identification documents belonging to people not
involved in this case. Police later found marijuana in Defendant's bedroom
along with checks similar to those found in the safe. During later questioning,
Defendant admitted that the drugs in the safe were his and not his wife's. A
passenger in the car told police that the safe and the drugs were Defendant's,
and the evidence corroborated her statement.
Defendant later repeatedly contacted the investigating detective offering
to reveal the identities of drug dealers in exchange for leniency. He claimed to
know several dealers who trafficked in large ainounts of drugs, including one
from whom he could obtain pounds of heroin. There is no evidence that he
ever discussed his requests for leniency with the prosecuting attorney. See Utah
R. Evid. 410 (excluding statements "made during plea discussions with an

attorney for the prosecuting authority").
Has Defendant shown that his counsel was ineffective because he did not:
a. object under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, to testhnony that
Defendant offered to identify drug dealers in exchange for
leniency?
b. object to the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument asserting that
defendant was an admitted drug dealer who was dish·ibuting
pounds of heroin?
c. object that under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, the detective's
testilnony that Defendant discussed with him the possibility of
identifying drug dealers in exchange for leniency was inad1nissible
evidence of plea negotiations?

-2-
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Standard of Review. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims raised for the
first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App
160, if 34, 354 P.3d 791.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains Utah R. Evid. 403, and 410.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.

Officers from the Utah County Major Crhnes Task Force were surveilling
Defendant's home in Lindon, Utah, when they saw a car leave. R446,451-53.
Police followed the car. R453. They did not see Defendant enter the car and
were not sure who was in the car, but hoped that it was Defendant. R45354,524. Officers briefly lost sight of the car when it pulled behind a convenience
store. R453-55. The car shortly reappeared, however, and police stopped it
after observing several traffic violations. R455-56. They found two women in
the car, Arja Aaltonnen and Heather Marsh. R456.

Aaltonnen, the driver,

identified herself as Defendant's wife. R456-57.
Police suspected that the women dropped Defendant off behind the
convenience store, but no officer saw Defendant near the convenience store.
R526. The convenience store was within a drug free zone. R487.
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Marsh testified that Defendant was originally driving the car and that the
women dropped him off at what she thought was the Lindon City Building.
R558-64,571.

She was not sure, however, exactly where they dropped

Defendant off because she was lying down on the back seat at the time. R55864,571. The building housing the Lindon City offices is located about a block
north of the convenience store. R453-54,487;SE20.
Officers' suspicions were heightened when they questioned the women
and received inconsistent statements. R457-58. A drug dog indicated that the
vehicle contained drugs. R458.
Police found methamphetamine and a pipe in Marsh's coat pocket and
another package of methamphetamine in her bra.

R457-58,534.

They also

found a safe in the trunk that the drug dog indicated contained drugs. R459-60.
Defendant repeatedly called his wife's cellphone during the traffic stop.
R460. One of the officers, Detective Palmer, instructed her to answer and then
had her hand him the phone. R460-61. Detective Palmer spoke with Defendant
and asked him to come to the scene. R461-64. Defendant refused, and offered
to provide information about drug dealers in Utah County if Detective Palmer
would release his wife and Marsh and not open the safe. R461,508. Detective
Palmer would not agree to Defendant's proposal. R464.

-4-
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Defendant eventually agreed to meet officers at a different location, but
failed to appear there. R464-65. Officers instead discovered him trying to leave
his house with a suitcase. R465. When he saw the police, Defendant threw the
suitcase back inside the house and locked the door. R465. Officers arrested him
and brought him to the scene of the traffic stop. R465.
Meanwhile, Detective Palmer obtained a search warrant for the safe.
R466. He asked Defendant to give him the combination so he could "open it
nicely." R466. Defendant refused, claiming that doing so "would implicate
him." R466,542. Marsh testified that the safe was Defendant's, and that he had
put it in the trunk before they left his house. R564-65. She also testified that
Defendant used the safe to store drug paraphernalia and illegal drugs in
amounts for both personal use and distribution. R565-66.
Detective Palmer forcibly opened the safe and found:
• 17.5 grams of methamphetamine, or about 20 personal doses;

• 28 Oxycodone pills in a prescription bottle whose label bore
Defendant's name;
e

2 whole Alprazolan1 pills and half of a crumbled Alprazolam pill;

• additional methamphetamine packaged for individual sale;
e

a digital scale;

• several syringes;
• unlabeled prescription bottles;
• spoons, including a spoon with burn 1narks on it;
8

two glass pipes of
methamphetamine;

the

type

generally

used

for
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s1noking

• two credit cards, neither of which bore Defendant's name or the name
of anyone involved in the case; and
• payroll checks, a driver's license, correspondence, and bank deposit
slips all belonging to an individual who was not involved in this case.
R467,471-86,506-08,544-48;

State's Exhibits 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,

18,19,33.
During a search of Defendant's home, officers found 1n Defendant's
bedroom:
• marijuana;
• a bong;
• additional checks similar to those found in the safe; and
e

a temporary driver's license for someone not involved in the case.

R488-94,578-80;SE' s 22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,34.
Officers also found $540 in cash on Defendant. R494.
Detective Palmer arrested Defendant, who agreed to speak with him after
waiving his Miranda rights. R496-97. Defendant admitted that the drugs in the
safe belonged to him and insisted that his wife had nothing to do with them or
anything else in the safe. R510-11. Defendant never denied knowledge of the
safe or any of its contents. R512.
Defendant also offered to provide information about other drug dealers
in exchange for leniency. R511. Detective Palmer discussed with Defendant the
possibility of working as a confidential informant, but Detective Palmer

-6-
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explained that he would have to consult the prosecuting attorney before he
could make any such arrangement. RSll-12.
Over the next several weeks, Defendant called Detective Palmer 15-20
times offering to work as a confidential informant in exchange for leniency on
II

his drug charges. R512-13. Defendant claimed to know several ... big players
... that carry weight," meaning that they distribute large amounts of illegal
drugs, specifically methamphetamine. R514.
Defendant gave Detective Palmer some names. R514. The Detective also
had Defendant make phone calls to alleged drug dealers.

R514-15.

The

individuals that Defendant identified were selling drugs, but not in the
quantities the Detective was investigating. R515. As a member of the Utah
II

County Major Crimes Task Force, Detective Palmer was hoping to climb the
[drug-distribution] ladder versus go down." R446,515. Accordingly, Detective
Palmer told Defendant that his offer to work as an informant was "just not
going to work." R515.
Defendant also contacted a local DEA agent and asked whether the agent
could help him with the charges in this case. R591-92. Defendant specifically
asked for help with his charges involving Detective Palmer and the prosecutor
assigned to this case. R592. Defendant claimed that he could provide the name
of an individual who could supply Defendant with pounds of heroin from

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Mexico.

R593.

He told the agent that Utah County officers were being

unreasonable and refusing to work with him. R598-96.
The agent told Defendant that he would have to talk to the state
prosecutor and local law enforcement officers before making any arrangements,
II

and that he had no authority to make any deals." R596. After speaking with
II

local authorities, the agent told Defendant that it wasn't worth it ... to pursue"
the individual that Defendant had identified. R597. Defendant responded with
anger and antagonism. R596-98.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

The State charged Defendant with two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug free zone, first degree
felonies; two counts of possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone,
class A misdemeanors; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in a
drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor. R32-33. A jury convicted Defendant as
charged, but did not find that any of the offenses occurred within a drug free
zone. R324-28. The trial court therefore recorded Defendant's convictions for
possession with intent to distribute as second degree felonies, and his
re1naining convictions as class B misdemeanors.

R354.

The trial court

sentenced defendant to imprisonment for one to fifteen years on the two second

-8-
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degree felonies and to jail for 180 days on the three class B misdemeanors, all to
run concurrently. R354-55. Defendant timely appeals. R357.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he did not
object under rule 403 to testimony that he volunteered to identify drug dealers
in exchange for leniency. Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption
that his counsel reasonably chose not to object to this testimony because he
concluded that rule 403 would not exclude it. That rule creates a high bar to
excluding relevant evidence. It applies only when the evidence's probative
value is substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice.
Counsel could have reasonably concluded that the testimony had high
probative value because it helped to explain who possessed the drugs in the
safe. Although Defendant initially admitted to the detective that the drugs
were his, his counsel argued at trial that the drugs were not Defendant's
because he was not in the car when the safe was discovered in its trunk.
Defendant's statements that he knew several high-level drug dealers, and that
he could obtain large amounts of drugs from them, where therefore highly
relevant to establishing that the wide variety and distributable amounts of
drugs in the safe were his.

-9- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Counsel also could have reasonably concluded that the trial court would
view defendant's repeated offers to identify drug dealers in exchange for
leniency as highly probative because they were arguably tacit admissions of
guilt. Defendant's requests for leniency arguably showed that he believed that
the charges against him were valid. The evidence also had a low potential for
unfair prejudice because Defendant's offers to identify drug dealers were
always tied to his requests for leniency, therefore reducing the chance that the
jury would consider the testimony only as evidence that Defendant knew drug
dealers. Given all this, counsel could have reasonably decided that a rule 403
objection would be futile.
Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection would
have in fact been futile and the remaining evidence against him was
overwhelming. Defendant admitted that the drugs in the safe were his and the
remaining evidence strongly tied him to those drugs.

B. Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective because he did
not object to the prosecutor's closing argument that Defendant was an admitted
drug dealer who was distributing pounds of heroin. Defendant claims that this
argument was unsupported by the evidence because Defendant never admitted
that the drugs in the safe were his, and claimed only to have access to someone
who could supply him with pounds of heroin.

-10-
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Defendant again fails to rebut the strong presumption that his counsel
reasonably chose not to object to this testimony.

Defendant did in fact admit

that the distributable amounts of drugs in the safe were his. The evidence
therefore supported the prosecutor's argument that Defendant was an admitted
drug dealer.
The prosecutor's argument that Defendant admitted that he was
distributing pounds of heroin was arguably a reasonable inference from
Defendant's statements. But even if it were not, counsel could have reasonably
decided that objecting to the misstatement would have been more harmful than
helpful. Had counsel objected, the prosecutor likely would have clarified that
although Defendant said only that he had access to someone who could supply
pounds of heroin, his admission suggested that he was in fact obtaining heroin
in those amounts.

The prosecutor also could have emphasized again that

Defendant offered to identify this heroin supplier in exchange for leniencyarguably a tacit admission of guilt.
misstatement was not inflan1matory.

Additionally, this single, isolated
Counsel could therefore reasonably

decide to refrain from objecting because doing so likely would have
emphasized negative aspects of the case.
Moreover, Defendant cannot show prejudice because the evidence
against him was overwhelming.

-11-
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C. Defendant finally argues that his counsel was ineffective because he
did not object to the detective's testimony that Defendant offered to cooperate
with police in exchange for leniency. Defendant argues that this testimony was
inadmissible evidence of plea negotiations under rule 410, Utah Rules of
Evidence.

But Defendant asks for a rule 23B remand to develop further

evidence on this issue and therefore concedes that the record is inadequate to
decide it.
Although he nevertheless argues that his counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to this testimony, this argument is improper because it relies on
Defendant's extra-record affidavit attached to his rule 23B remand motion. The
argument also fails because it is based on non-controlling authority. Counsel
performs deficiently only when he ignores controlling law. In any event, the
record refutes the argument. Rule 410 excludes only statements made to the
prosecutor.

All of Defendant's statements at issue here were made to the

detective.

-12-
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ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE DID NOT OBJECT TO: (1) TESTIMONY
THAT DEFENDANT VOLUNTEERED TO IDENTIFY DRUG DEALERS IN
EXCHANGE FOR LENIENCY; (2) THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING
ARGUMENT; OR (3) TESTIMONY THAT ALLEGEDLY RECOUNTED
STATEMENTS MADE DURING PLEA NEGOTIATIONS

Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in three ways. First, he
asserts that his counsel should have objected under rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence, to testimony that Defendant offered to reveal the identities of drug
dealers in exchange for leniency. Br.Aplt.8. Second, Defendant argues that his
counsel should have objected to portions of the prosecutor's closing argument
that allegedly misstated the evidence. Br.Aplt.14. Finally, Defendant argues
that his counsel should have objected under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, to
testimony that allegedly involved plea negotiations. Br.Aplt.22. Defendant
recognizes, however, that the record is inadequate to review this third issue and
therefore seeks a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
develop evidence to support it. Br.Aplt.22; Motion for Remand.
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective in any respect.
A. Defendant cannot rebut the strong presumption that his counsel
reasonably decided not to object under rule 403; nor has he
shown prejudice.

Defendant first argues that his counsel should have objected under rule
403 to testimony from the detective and a DEA agent that Defendant

-13-
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volunteered to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency on these charges.
Br.Aplt.8. He asserts that this testimony had low probative value because it did
not help the jury to determine (1) whether the drugs in the safe belonged to
him, or (2) whether he intended to distribute the drugs, where there was no
evidence that the drug dealers he knew were cmmected with the charged
crimes.

Br.Aplt.9.

Defendant contends that the evidence improperly

"encouraged the jury to find [him] guilty because he knew drug dealers."
Br.Aplt.11.
To prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant "must show' (1) that
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable
probability exists that but for the deficient conduct [Defendant] would have
obtained a more favorable outcome at trial."' State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 42,
328 P.3d 841 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162); Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694 (1984). Defendant cannot do so.
1. Defendant cannot re but the strong presumption that his
counsel reasonably decided to forgo a rule 403 objection
because the testimony had strong probative value and posed
little danger of unfair prejudice.

This Court's review of counsel's performance begins with "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The presumption exists because of the "variety of

-14-
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circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The presumption also
recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with
the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Defendant can rebut this strong presumption only "by persuading the
court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." Clark, 2004
UT 25, ,J6 (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted). The State is
not required to articulate a reasonable explanation for counsel's acts or
omissions. Nor does a defendant succeed merely because this Court cannot
conceive of a tactical explanation for counsel's performance.

Rather, '"the

defendant"' always bears the burden to "' overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy."' Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ,19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689) (emphasis added); see also State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ,I46, 154
P.3d 788. But when it is possible to conceive of a reasonable tactical basis for
trial counsel's actions, then a defendant clearly has not rebutted the strong
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presumption that his counsel performed reasonably. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, iJ7;

State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, iJ58, 61 P.3d 291.
Reasonably concluding that an objection will be futile is a conceivable
tactical basis for not raising that objection. Futile objections do not affect the
evidence before the jury. They do, however, have the potential to annoy or
even alienate the jury. Such objections can also annoy and alienate the trial
court and the prosecutor, with whom counsel may have interact with in the
future. Thus, failure "to raise futile objections or motions does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, 150, 354
P.3d 775.
Defendant's counsel could have reasonably concluded that it would be
futile to object under rule 403. That rule presumes that evidence is admissible
and imposes a high hurdle for excluding evidence. Relevant evidence may be
excluded under the rule only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by," among other things, "a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403
(emphasis added). The rule "imposes ... the heavy burden not only to show
that the risk of unfair prejudice is greater than the probative value, but that it
'"substantially outweigh[s]' the probative value." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19,
,29, 345 P.3d 1195 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403) (alteration in original). "Given
this bar, [courts] 'indulge a presumption in favor of admissibility."'
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Lucero,

2014 UT 15, 132 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993)).
~

Indeed, rule 403 "'is an "inclusionary" rule."' State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App
222, 126, 112 P.3d 1252 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah App.
1996)).
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it "has an 'undue tendency to
suggest decision upon an improper basis."' Lucero, 2014 UT 15, 132 (quoting

~

State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, 122, 275 P.3d 1050). Evidence "is not unfairly
prejudicial simply because it is detrimental to a party's case."' Kooyman, 2005
UT App 222, 126 (quoting United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir.
2001)).
Counsel could have reasonably concluded that the challenged testimony
had high probative value for two reasons. First, it was directly relevant to the
disputed issue of who owned the drugs. Second, counsel could reasonably
conclude that the testimony arguably showed that Defendant had tacitly
admitted his guilt. The detective testified that Defendant repeatedly offered to
identify "big players ... that carry weight" - meaning "people who distribute ...
large amounts of illegal drugs" - "in exchange for leniency on these charges."
~

R514. A DEA agent also testified that Defendant contacted him offering to
identify an individual who could supply pounds of heroin if the agent would
contact the detective and prosecutor in this case. R592-93.
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This evidence was highly probative of who owned the distributable
amounts of various drugs in the safe. Although Defendant initially admitted to
the detective that the drugs were his, RSl0-11, his counsel argued at trial that
the drugs were not Defendant's because he was not in the car when the safe
was discovered in its trunk, R656. Evidence that Defendant had direct access to
several suppliers of dish·ibutable amounts of drugs made it highly likely the
large amounts and wide variety of drugs in the safe belonged to him. In other
words, Defendant's admissions that he had access to drug wholesalers made it
highly likely that he was a drug retailer.
For example, in United States v. Haynes, 372 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir.
2004), the defendant's statement that he knew a woman who manufactured
methamphetamine using a particular method was admissible under federal rule
403, even though it showed that the defendant associated with drug dealers,
because the admission was highly relevant to a disputed issue. Haynes was
charged with attempting to manufacture methamphetamine after police found
in his home various chemicals and equipment associated with manufacturing
methamphetamine.

Id. at 1166.

Haynes claimed that he possessed the

incriminating items only for making beer, and he introduced testimony that
some of the incriminating items had non-crin1inal uses. Id. at 1166-67. One of
the substances found in his home contained a substantial amount of phenyl-2-
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propanone (P2P), and one method for making methamphetamine requires P2P.
~

Id.
Haynes objected under federal rule 403 when the prosecution offered
testimony that he told a DEA agent "that he knew a woman who manufactured
methamphetamine using the P2P method." Id. at 1167. He argued that the
evidence '"posed a danger that the jury would convict on the ground that [he]
apparently associated with drug dealers."' Id. (alteration in original). The trial
court overruled the objection and "admitted the statement, saying that although
it was prejudicial, it was also 'highly probative' of Defendant's knowledge." Id.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. It held that the statement was "relevant
to show that Defendant was aware that P2P could be used to manufacture
methamphetamine" and therefore "shed[] light on why Defendant possessed
the various items seized from this home." Id. Its probative value therefore was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Fed.
R. Evid. 403).

Likewise, defense counsel here could have reasonably concluded that
Defendant's admissions that he had access to high-level drug dealers were
highly probative of whether the drugs belonged to him.
Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that Defendant's
statements were highly probative because they arguably amounted to tacit
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admissions of guilt.

Defendant arguably admitted that he had engaged in

criminal behavior when, rather than disputing the allegations against him, he
attempted to obtain leniency by offering to identify other drug dealers.
Additionally, the testimony's context reduced, or arguably eliminated,
any danger for unfair prejudice. The testimony was always tied to Defendant's
requests for leniency.

R514,592-93.

Thus, the jury did not hear only that

Defendant knew other drug dealers. The jury would have therefore understood
the testimony to be important because it amounted to implicit admissions of
guilt, not merely evidence that Defendant knew other drug dealers.
Defendant cites several federal cases all holding that evidence that shows
only guilt by association is inadmissible under rule 403. Br.Aplt.10-11 (citing

e.g. United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1999)). But none of those cases
involved a defendant's admissions that he had access to distributors of large
amounts of drugs, or his requests to reveal his sources in exchange for leniency.
As explained, the evidence here showed more than just that Defendant "knew a
criminal." See Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 742. Defendant's cases therefore do not
establish that counsel unreasonably chose not to object under rule 403.
In short, the challenged testimony was highly probative of Defendant's
guilt and possessed little, if any, danger of unfair prejudice.
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Defendant

therefore has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel performed
effectively by not objecting under rule 403.
2. Defendant cannot show prejudice because rule 403 would not
have excluded the evidence and, even if it would have, the
remaining evidence against him was overwhelming.

To establish prejudice, Defendant must show "' a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt."'

State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, iJ86, 152 P.3d 321 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).

A reasonable probability is one "sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotations
and citation on1itted). Defendant n1ust do n1ore than show "that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. "Counsel's
errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable." Id.
Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection would
have in fact been futile. For the reasons explained above, the rule would not
have excluded the testi1nony because its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Because the failure "to raise futile
objections or motions does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,"
Defendant cannot show prejudice. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, ,ISO.
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But even if such a motion would have succeeded, Defendant still cannot
demonstrate prejudice because the remaining evidence against him was
overwhelming.
Defendant.

There was no real dispute that the drugs belonged to

Most importantly, Defendant admitted to the investigating

detective that the drugs in the safe belonged to him. RSl0-11.
In addition, Heather Marsh, a passenger in the car, testified that the safe
belonged to Defendant, that he had put it in the trunk, and that he used the safe
to store drugs.

R564-66.

The evidence corroborated Marsh's testimony.

Defendant asked the police not to open the safe and he refused to give the
detective the combination because he acknowledged that doing so "would
implicate him." R461,466.

A prescription bottle in the safe that contained

Oxycodone had a label that bore Defendant's name, and checks similar to those
in the safe were found with the 1narijuana discovered in Defendant's bedroom.
R476-77,488-94. Finally, Defendant did not introduce any evidence to dispute

the detective's testimony that the safe contained distributable amounts of
methamphetamine and Oxycodone.

R473,476-78.

This, coupled with

Defendant's admission that the drugs belonged to him, established his guilt for
possession with intent to distribute even without the evidence that he claimed
to know other drug dealers. Defendant therefore cannot show that he was
prejudiced by any deficient performance arising from the lack of a rule 403
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objection. Consequently, he has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for
not making a rule 403 objection.
B.

Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his
counsel reasonably handled the prosecutor's closing argument,
nor has he shown prejudice.

Defendant next argues that his counsel should have objected to portions
of the prosecutor's closing argun1ent that allegedly "111isstated the evidence and
that were inflammatory." Br.Aplt.14. He argues that the prosecutor misstated
the evidence when he argued- in the context of recounting Defendant's offers
for leniency-that Defendant (1) admitted he was a drug dealer, and (2) said he
was distributing pounds of heroin.

Id.

Defendant has not shown either

deficient performance or prejudice.
1. Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his
counsel reasonably decided not to object because an
objection would have been futile and served to emphasize
negative aspects of the case.

During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury
of Defendant's offers to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency. R670-73.
He argued that Defendant admitted he was a drug dealer, and that he was
dish·ibuting pounds of heroin. R672. The prosecutor stated:
Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to work off charges with the
Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA, how many of us would have
the wherewithal to call the DEA and say, Hey, I've got these drug
charges, I need to work, I'm moving tons of weight, pounds of
heroin.
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R672 (Addendum Bis a copy of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing).
Defendant asserts that this argument was improper, and therefore his
counsel should have objected, because no evidence supported the assertion that
he was an admitted drug dealer or that he was distributing pounds of heroin.
Br.Aplt.16. Defendant is mistaken.
A prosecutor's closing argument is proper when it is supported by the
evidence, or reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Houston, 2015 UT
40, ,I76, 353 P.3d 55. Counsel '" for both sides have considerable latitude in their
closing arguments. They have the right to fully discuss from their perspectives
the evidence and all inferences and deductions it supports."' Id. (quoting State

v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). The prosecutor's arguments here
were well supported by the evidence and the reasonable inferences from that
evidence.
Defendant first argues that "there was no evidence [of Defendant] stating
that the drugs were his." Br.Aplt.16. On the contrary, the detective testified
that when he asked Defendant about the safe full of drugs and paraphernalia
found in the trunk of the car his wife was driving, Defendant admitted "that the
drugs where his, they weren't hers at all." R510-ll. Thus, the evidence did
show that Defendant admitted that the drugs in the safe were his.
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Further, Defendant did not dispute that the drugs that he admitted were
his were in distributable amounts.

The evidence therefore provided the

prosecutor with a solid foundation from which to argue that Defendant
admitted that he was a drug dealer.
Defendant's repeated offers to identify drug dealers that he knew also
supported a reasonable inference that Defendant was an admitted drug dealer.
As explained, Defendant told a DEA agent that "he was capable of getting
pounds" of heroin from a "Mexican source." R593. A reasonable inference
from Defendant's admission that he had access to pounds of heroin is that
Defendant is a heroin dealer.
Defendant's admissions, and the reasonable inferences from those
admissions, supported the prosecutor's argument that Defendant was an
admitted drug dealer. The argument was therefore proper and any objection to
it would have been futile.

See Houston, 2015 UT 40, if 76.

Consequently,

Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel reasonably
chose not object. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 50.
Nor has Defendant rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel
reasonably chose not to object to the prosecutor's argument that Defendant was
"moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin." R672. Again, this statement was
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arguably a reasonable inference from Defendant's claim that he had access to
someone who could supply him with pounds of heroin.
But even if the prosecutor's argument was technically objectionable, the
Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to object to every inaccuracy in a
closing argument. See State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, if 71, 318 P.3d 1221
(recognizing that some "instances of prosecutorial misconduct, standing alone,
may not have required an objection from trial counsel"). When counsel does
not "object to a prosecutor's statements during closing argument, the question
is 'not whether the prosecutor's comments were proper, but whether they were so

improper that counsel's only defensible choice was to interrupt those comments
with an objection." Houston, 2015 UT 40, ~76 (quoting Bussard v. Lockhart, 32
F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir.1994)) (emphasis in original). One reason counsel can
reasonably decide not to object to "improper" closing argument is to avoid
"emphasiz[ing] the negative aspects of the case to the jury." West Valley City v.

Rislow, 736 P.2d 637, 638 (Utah App. 1987). Defendant's case presents a prime
example of an opportunity to employ that strategy.
Counsel could have reasonably concluded that objecting to the
prosecutor's alleged misstatement would have given the prosecutor another
opportunity to clarify his argument in a way that would have ended up in the
same place-evidence that Defendant knew someone who could supply hiln
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with pounds of heroin supported an inference that Defendant was getting
pounds of heroin to sell himself.
Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that objecting would have
allowed the prosecutor to again emphasize what the jury could arguably
conclude were Defendant's tacit admissions of guilt. Had counsel raised the
objection that Defendant now identifies, the prosecutor may have taken the
opportunity to clarify that although Defendant did not directly admit that he
was distributing pounds of heroin, he did admit that he had a source that could
provide him with that amount, and that Defendant made this admission in the
context of seeking leniency on these charges.

Defense counsel could have

reasonably decided that this clarification would have been more harmful than
helpful because it would have served to reinforce the idea that Defendant's
repeated offers to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency were arguably
tacit admissions of guilt.
Defendant asserts that counsel was required to object because the
argument was "improper and inflammatory." Br.Aplt.18. But counsel could
have reasonably decided that the prosecutor's statement about pounds of
heroin was not inflammatory because it was a single, isolated remark. See State
v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if 34,322 P.3d 761 (holding that prosecutor's improper

remark during closing argument "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
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because it was a singular, isolated statement and was not the focus of the
prosecutor's argument").
In short, because conceivable strategic reasons support counsel's decision
not to object to the prosecutor's closing argument, Defendant has failed to rebut
the strong presumption that his counsel performed reasonably. See State v.
Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162.
2. Defendant cannot show prejudice because the evidence
against him was overwhelming.

Even if his counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's closing
argument, Defendant cannot show prejudice. As explained, an objection to the
statement that Defendant was distributing pounds of heroin likely would have
done more harm than good.
Additionally, as explained, the evidence against Defendant was
overwhelming. Defendant directly admitted that the drugs in the safe belonged
to him, and he did not dispute that they were in distributable amounts.
Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably inferred from his repeated
requests for leniency that he had tacitly admitted his guilt. And other evidence
strongly tied Defendant to the drugs in the safe and in his bedroom. Defendant
therefore cannot show that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance that
may have occurred. See Hales, 2007 UT 14, ,I86. Consequently, he cannot show
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that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's closing
argument.

C. The record is inadequate to resolve Defendant's claim that his
counsel was ineffective for not objecting under rule 410 to
testimony that allegedly involved plea discussions; in any event,
the controlling law available to counsel would not have
supported an argument that Defendant's discussions with police
were plea negotiations.
Defendant finally argues that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting
under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, to the detective's testimony that
Defendant offered to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency. Br.Aplt.22.
Defendant argues that this testimony was inadmissible because it involved
statements made during plea negotiations. Br.Aplt.22-26. Defendant seeks a
remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the
record with his testimony regarding his discussions with the detective.
Br.Aplt.22. He notes that although the record contains the detective's testimony
about alleged plea negotiations, "it does not contain any information about
[Defendant's] views of those negotiations." Br.Aplt.23.
Although he recognizes that the record is inadequate to review this claim,
Defendant nevertheless relies on his extra-record affidavit attached to his rule
23B motion to argue in his brief that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting
to the detective's testimony under rule 410. Br.Aplt.22-26. This is improper.
Defendant's extra-record affidavit is relevant only to determining whether a
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rule 23B remand is appropriate. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah
App. 1998) (affidavits supporting rule 23B motions are considered "solely to
determine the propriety of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims
for evidentiary hearings"). The affidavit is not part of the record on appeal and
therefore cannot support a holding that counsel was ineffective.
Defendant's assertion that a rule 23B remand hearing is required to
develop evidence on this claim necessarily admits that the current record is
inadequate to decide it. This Court therefore cannot find, based on this record,
that Defendant's counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Defendant's
testimony under rule 410. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if16, 12 P.3d 92
II

(holding that because an appellate court will presume that any argument of
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which
II

[the] defendant is aware," if the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed 1n
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively").
In fact, the record refutes Defendant's claim that his counsel should have
objected to the detective's testimony under rule 410. That rule excludes only
statements made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting
II

authority." Utah R. Evid. 410 (emphasis added). All of Defendant's statements
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at issue here were made to the investigating detective, not to the prosecutor.
R511-14.
Defendant argues that rule 410 can be read to include statements made to
a law enforcement officer who represents that he has authority to negotiate a
plea bargain. Br.Aplt.24-25. He relies entirely on non-controlling authority to
support this novel interpretation.

Br.Aplt.24-25.

This alone defeats his

argument that his counsel performed deficiently.
A showing of deficient performance must be based on "the law in effect
at the time of trial." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). In other
words, to perform deficiently, counsel must disregard "controlling appellate
law" that existed at the time of trial. State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, if 9, 228 P.3d
1255; see also In re N.A.D., 2014 UT App 249, iJ6, 338 P.3d 226 ("Because there
was no basis in existing law for N.A.D.' s counsel to have requested that the
juvenile court judge recuse herself, N.A.D. cannot show that his counsel
performed deficiently."). Defendant does not identify, not could the State find,
any controlling authority interpreting rule 410 as he does. Defendant therefore
cannot show that his counsel performed deficiently.
But even if Defendant could base his claim on non-controlling authority,
the record contains no evidence that the detective represented that he had any
authority to engage in plea negotiations. Rather, as Defendant acknowledges,
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the "detective testified that before he could make a deal with [Defendant] he
had to talk to the prosecuting attorney." Br.Aplt.22 (citing RSll-12). Defendant
therefore cannot show from this record that his counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the detective's statements under rule 410, because that rule was
inapplicable even under his novel reading. See Utah R. Evid. 410. 1

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on 20 April 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD

Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee

1

Defendant's rule 23B affidavit proffers that the detective represented
that he could reduce Defendant's charges if Defendant cooperated. Br.Aplt.2324. As explained in the State's opposition to the remand motion, this Court
should deny the 1notion because it is based on non-controlling authority, and
counsel is not required to raise novel arguments based on non-controlling
authority. Additionally, Defendant never proffers that he told his counsel
about the detective's alleged representations that he could reduce Defendant's
charges.
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Addendum A

Utah R. Evid. 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice,
Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
2011 Advisory Committee Note.

The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the
Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a
basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of
substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as
contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403
indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate
method of dealing with" surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D.
Tex. 1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial
and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect.
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615
P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
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Utah R. Evid. 410. Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is
not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the
plea discussions:
(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn;
(2) a nolo contendere plea;
(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or

(4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the
prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or
they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.

(b) Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3)
or (4):
(1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same
plea or plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements
ought to be considered together; or
(2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false sta te1nent, if the
defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel
present.

2011 Advisory Committee Note.
The language of this rule has been amended as part of
Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

the restyling of the
to make style and
are intended to be
ruling on evidence

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. There was no comparable rule in the
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). However, withdrawn pleas of guilty have been
ruled inadmissible by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Jensen, 74 Utah 299, 279 P.
506 (1929).
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Rule 410(4) does not cover plea negotiations with public officials other
than prosecuting attorneys. There are still constitutional limitations on the use of
statements obtained from suspects. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199,
12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964).
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@

charges.

Thank you for your time.

2

THE COURT:

Thank you very much, counsel.

3

State may be heard.

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

All right,

Thank you,

Your Honor.

ladies and gentlemen,

I want to respond

6

to a few things that Mr. Stewart has brought up to help

7

assuage your mind as you make this deliberation.

8

start with one of the instructions that he brought up.

9

talked to you about knowingly and intentionally and those are

I want to
He

10

pretty self explanatory.

11

things were in the safe, if the safe wasn't his,

12

we haven't shown that then he would not be guilty,

13

with that.

14

talks about defining intent when it says intent and then you

15

skip down to the third line,

16

be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances

17

and that's frankly what kills Mr. Edgar in this case.

18

Detective Palmer had taken the phone call that the defendant

19

made to Arja, his wife/girlfriend and had said, Hey,

20

trying to get ahold of my wife. She needed to get picked up

21

from a meeting I just had. Where is she?

22

instead of saying, Oh, crap. Do not open the safe, let them

23

go and I will come and cooperate and talk to you and give up

24

other drug dealers.

25

acts, conduct.

@

Obviously if he didn't know these
if he -

if

I agree

But No. Instruction 16, that third line when it

it says intent must ordinarily

If

just

What's going on

Intent is inferred from statements,

Is that the conduct of someone who is

----------··006~
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1

innocent, that did not knowingly and intentionally possess

2

these things?

3

of monkeying around with police for 20, 30 minutes and not

4

meeting up and delaying things?

5

this time?

6

setting up and following through with the agreement they're

7

trying to make with him?

8

home realizing, Oh, crap, the police are onto me, I better

9

get home get rid of whatever I have at my house before the

Someone that then came to the scene after kind

What is he doing during all

What's he trying to buy time for while he's not

Is it possible that he's walking

10

police get a search warrant get back to my house.

Isn't

11

that more reasonable than some idea that, oh, he's just

12

hanging out at home all night, watching TV, his

13

girlfriend/wife takes the car out with his safe in it,

14

calls what,

15

launches into this negotiation with the police.

16

it common sense, use your life experience.

17

reasonable here?

he

just to check in on them and then immediately
Looking at

What is more

He talks about the pills bottle and tries to make

18
19

it a bit of a moving target.

20

for Mr. Edgar of oxycodone from a doctor that is legitimate

21

oxycodone or did Detective Palmer misidentify it and i t ' s all

22

counterfeit drugs and it was never chemically tested so we

23

don't know what this is.

24

reasonable that his doctor prescribed him 113 counterfeit

25

oxycodone?

Probably not.

So either it's a prescription

What is reasonable here?

Is it

Is it more reasonable - or is it
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1

reasonable that the police planted this.

2

at the pictures, it's not in the pictures.

3

did it come from?

4

pocket, throw it in there?

5

I mean, what's reasonable here?

6

Marsh's testimony matches up that he kept oxys in there and

7

shockingly, here are oxys.

8

and experience - this isn't his first day on the job -

9

testified that in his experience as not only just an officer,

He's saying,

Look

Well, so where

Detective Palmer pull it out of his
Throw counterfeit drugs in there?
It's reasonable that Heather

Based on the detective's training
he

10

a drug officer but as a drug recognition officer, this is a

11

common practice, look online,

12

that, they matched up.

13

distract you.

14

look at the markings, he did

It's oxycontin.

Don't let that

The whole thing talking about the meth,

16 grams,

15

17.5 grams, whatever and that's consistent, isn't it?

16

Detective Palmer said originally it's 17.5 grams, said the

17

baggy weighs maybe a gram and the Crime Lab tested it and lo

18

and behold it's 16 grams and based on his training and

19

experience they can be sold in gram levels or 1.75 grams.

20

He's seen all sorts,

21

quantities or 15 personal quantities,

22

or five hits which was the testimony off of each one of those

23

quantifies, this is a distributable amount and when you match

24

that up with additional baggies to package it in,

25

packaged with intent to distribute when they're all in the

so whether it's up to 10 personal
if you're getting four

it's

@
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1

same place.

2

not Betty Crocker, he's not making brownies.

3

have digital scales there in the safe?

4

Not to mention the digital scales here.

He's

Why does he

Again, what interest would Mr. Edgar have in any of

5

this if he had just told the police, Hey, do what you will,

6

I'm at home,

7

safe?

8

that safe?

9

what was in the safe because it was his including his pill

I have no idea what's in the car. Safe?

®

What

Why did he care so much to tell the police do not open
Well, because he knowingly and intentionally knew

10

bottle, including his stash of drugs which was consistent

11

with what Heather Marsh said.

12

Marsh came in here to tell us all a big tale?

13

really the big drug dealer behind all this?

14

sentenced over a year ago on a drug case associated with

15

this.

16

She was asked by Mr. Stewart, Did the police come down to the

17

jail and try to flip you, try to get you to testify and work

18

some deal out so you could get your misdemeanor, get your 45

19

days of jail, what a gift?

20

that she did.

21

for her testimony despite however he asked the question.

22

what you're left with is someone whose here, afraid,

23

testifying about what happened a year and a half ago saying

24

Hey,

25

in Provo primarily,

She took responsibility.

No.

Is it possible that Heather

@

That she's
She was

I mean, what did she say?

There's no testimony saying

There's no testimony saying she got anything

I'm not familiar with the area that much,

So

I was living

lived there in Lindon a day or two,
32
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wasn't feeling good.

2

at home that night. Mr. Edgar comes home, he's angry saying,

3

Hey, we got this appointment, gotta go, we've got to get the

4

check deposited whatever, whatever.

5

a meeting at the city office building,

6

the car - well, first he, what does she say, he takes the

7

safe off of the couch and puts it in the car and secures it

8

in the trunk.

9

from that happening.

Okay.

He says I've got

let's go.

He gets in

That's some details that stand out in her mind
Does that sound like something she's

10

just making up from a year and a half ago or does it sound

11

like something that really happened, the defendant

12

transported this; that he knowingly and intentionally

13

possessed these items?

14

drives the car even though it's his girlfriend/wife's car.

15

Sounds consistent.

He's driving the car like he usually

Next thing she knows basically, she's laying down

16
@

I was laying down in the car. We were

17

in the car, they make one stop, he gets out, girlfriend/wife

18

goes to drive, Heather goes from the backseat to the

19

passenger seat.

20

that sound more consistent?

21

ago,

22

with the area as opposed to Detective Palmer and his four or

23

five other officers conducting surveillance, trying to stay a

24

safe distance behind these guys, trying to make sure they

25

don't tip them off and they're observing where they're going

@

That's how the police find them.
She, you know,

Doesn't

a year and a half

again she's laying down, not feeling good, not familiar

@

@
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1

for the most part and then when they get to this 7-Eleven

2

area and say, Hey, we lost contact with them behind the

3

building for about 30 seconds.

4

you.

5

And then again,
I,

That's the evidence before

you look at the drug free zone, you

6

know,

I, maybe I'd agree more with Mr. Stewart if you

7

know, this said 995 feet and it was within a few feet and

8

maybe they cut here, maybe they cut here but under 500 feet

9

takes up this entire property.

Add another 500 feet and what

10

have you got now?

11

doubt?

12

this by a couple of blocks, that they were never in this

13

area?

14

behind this area,

15

otherwise is not something you should consider as a

16

reasonable doubt with respect to the drug free zone.

Fit anywhere in here.

Beyond a reasonable

Is it possible they, the police totally misjudged

No.

They were conducting surveillance, they lost them
it's within a drug free zone.

Saying

Mr. Stewart mentions with Agent Holmer, talking

17
18

about the heroin, the comment about someone calls up out of

19

the blue says they're Michael Edgar, what are the chances?

20

So what does someone have to gain, right?

21

possible that one of us today could go and call the DEA,

22

pretend to Michael Edgar - probably have to be a male -

23

say, Hey,

24

work.

25

hook me up.

@

I mean is i t

and

I'm Michael Edgar, got some drug charges, want to

Oh,

I've got connections with all sorts of people,
Well so,

if this were to actually go into

34
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1

effect, Agent Holmer were to go and track down Mr. Edgar,

2

down with him, can you imagine the conversation?

3

your call, let's do this.

4

what,

5

name.

6

that's what they're positing is the explanation here.

7

probably what happened.

8

that I was the prosecutor and happened to know that Detective

9

Palmer was the case officer on this case.

Hey,

sit

got

Mr. Edgar is going to be like

I'm never talked to you.

Someone must be using my

What exactly is to be gained by any of that?

But
That's

Oh, and the caller happened to know

Imagine the

10

coincidence that that would happen.

It's a doubt, certainly

11

it's a doubt.

12

were Michael Edgar, gave a phone number that he when he

13

called back, Hi,

14

that reasonable doubt?

15

- and I'll just read to you the part of the Jury Instruction

16

No. 19 again, the second paragraph where it says uthere are

17

very few things in this world that we know with absolute

18

certainty.

19

uthe law does not require proof that overcomes every possible

20

doubt."

21

bricks in the wall or bricks in the path, whatever, they're

22

doubts,

23

that's a doubt,

24

Is it a reasonable doubt looking at the totality of all the

25

evidence?

Someone could have called and pretended they

this is Michael Edgar, that happened too,

is

And that's where you have to look at

In criminal cases" - this is a criminal case

So certainly he's brought up some doubts, these

sure.

No,

You can look at them,

isolate them, yeah,

someone could have called, that's possible.

it's not.

Considering this is the same

35
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1

conduct he used with Detective Palmer the day of the first

2

phone call, from the first in-person meeting, from four days

3

later at the jail when he's still offering up to work.

4

Imagine his surprise, you know, seven months later to get a

5

call from DEA agents saying Mr. Edgar wants to work with us

6

now, he's not satisfied with what you did.

7

comments were, yeah, we didn't work with him.

8

information that's unique to Mr. Edgar was transmitted to

9

this DEA agent whose here just to tell you about this

10

conversation.

11

or me, goes to his credibility.

Well, his
So again,

He didn't have a prior relationship with him

You know, Mr. Stewart didn't mention it much in his

12
13

closing but during his cross examination of the Crime Lab,

14

Amberlee Neibaur, he's asking her about prescription

15

methamphetamine, isn't there such a thing as prescription

16

methamphetamine?

17

Okay, that's a doubt.

18

methamphetamine.

19

reasonable doubt.

20

work off charges with the Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA,

21

how many of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA and

22

say, Hey,

23

moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin.

24

heroin?

25

Heather Marsh mentioned heroin.

Sure, it's possible.

Is that a doubt?

There's such a thing as prescription

Is that a reasonable doubt?

No,

i t ' s not a

Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to

I've got these drug charges,

I need to work,

@

I'm

Who else mentioned

Mr. Stewart said no one else mentioned heroin.
What does the defendant keep
36
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1

in his safe?

2

Just because heroin and Clonazepam weren't in the safe,

3

that mean it's not his safe all of a sudden?

4

ladies and gentlemen, you're looking at the evidence that's

5

before you that has to be reasonable and the reasonable

6

explanation is that he's a drug dealer and you'll get two

7

carts worth of evidence.

8

for Mr. Edgar,

9

Someone has a safe of his that they've put all their stuff

10

in?

Meth, heroin, pills, oxys or oxys, Clonazepam.

I mean,

No.

does

Ultimately

is this all just a bad day

someone is using his name,

called the DEA?

That's not reasonable.

11

When you focus on the possession with intent to

12

distribute in a drug free zone, that's a lot of verbiage,

13

lot of clauses, a lot of phrases when you all run it

14

altogether.

15

he had to intend to distribute those items at that 7-Eleven.

16

That's not what we're here to say.

17

them by that 7-Eleven and why did he possess them?

18

talked about this,

19

personal stash, he possesses them because he's a drug dealer.

20

He's possessing with intent to distribute.

21

possessing them?

22

Elementary School,

23

don't get hung up on,

24

possess them,

25

free zone.

a

What you need to look at is it doesn't mean that

We're saying he possessed

this isn't his personal use,

Well,

Well,

we

isn't his

Where is he

it's within 1000 feet of Lindon

that's what makes it a drug free zone.
oh,

So

we have to show that he had to

distribute them right there within the drug

He could have wanted to distribute them that
37
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1

night,

2

area with the intent to distribute them at some point,

3

enough.

the next day,

as long as he possessed them within that

When you look at the evidence,

4

that's

reasons why the

5

defendant possessed the safe because Mr. Stewart talked

6

about, Oh,

7

some more proof that way.

8

testimony about he had access to it, how he had it from the

9

couch,

it was never fingerprinted. Oh, we should have had
You've also got Heather's

how he packed it, how he transported it into the car,

10

the whole combination thing.

11

are the police monkeying around with him if they've got Arja

12

and Heather who are giving up information left and right?

13

Heather is saying, Oh, yeah,

14

of a sudden she's going to say,

15

you the combination for that safe but by the way there's a

16

safe in the trunk.

17

truth and saying,

18

no combination to it.

19

Mr. Edgar.

20

owned it?

21

that he tells the police,

22

it might implicate me so I'm not going to do that.

23

know,

24

really work out.

25

Again,

Who had access to this?

I've got it in my bra,
oh,

Why

but all

but I'm not going to give

Or is more likely that she's telling the
Hey,

I had no combination to it, Arja had
That's why the police were talking to

Why would he have the combination to it unless he
And why would that be corroborated by the fact
I'll give you the combination but

frankly saying that implicates you.

Well,

you

So that didn't

his pill bottle was inside and just
38
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1

painfully over and over again he asked police not to open it.

2

Why would you care if you don't know what's inside?
Then under reasons why he possessed with intent to

3

@

4

distribute, again, half an ounce of meth, 28 pills of

5

oxycontin, you know,

6

street and they have a pill bottle in their pocket,

7

oxycontin, and that's all they have, private personal use,

8

private prescription,

9

totality of everything we have here, why is he possessing

10

these things?

11

if someone else is walking down the

I agree.

20

But when you look at i t in

To distribute them.

In the end ladies and gentlemen, he had a mobile

12

pharmacy.

You heard testimony about - a mobile pharmacy but

13

he is not a pharmacist.

14

Detective Palmer that, he told Agent Holmer that and his

15

actions and statements and the totality of the evidence back

16

that up and I ask that you find him guilty on all counts.

17

Thank you.

He is a drug dealer.

He told

18

THE COURT:

19

Let's have the deputy then sworn please.

20

Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

stand and raise your right hand.

21

{Whereupon the bailiff was sworn)

22

THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen, now is the time

23

for your deliberations.

24

exhibits.

25

If you'll

We will deliver to you all of the

Here's the original jury verdict form.
Officer, please, if you'll take that and place that
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